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Introduction
Climate Change
Since the Earth was formed, its climate has varied drastically (Ghil 2002). Periods of
warming and cooling have occurred as slow processes over millions of years, but within the last
150 years anthropogenic activity has resulted in a much faster warming than ever measured before
(USGCRP 2017). Due to our reliance on fossil fuels and other carbon-intensive activities, Earth
now has a “carbon budget” (Le Quere et al 2018) defined as the remaining amount of carbon
dioxide our collective society can emit before a tipping point of 1.5°C warming. The lifespan of
this budget is not long in comparison to the rate at which we are transitioning towards carbon
neutrality, and any action we can take to extend the budget is critical to avoiding the worst effects
of global climate change. Soil sequestration of organic carbon is one solution to drawing down
levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide (Lal 2004) that has the potential to be greatly increased.
3

Soil Sequestration and the Carbon Cycle
While some industrial sectors are focused on creating mechanical methods of capturing
carbon from the air, a natural method already exists: plants. The global carbon cycle is repeated
every year as plants start to grow in the spring and throughout the summer and then become
dormant or die in the fall and winter (Post et al 1990). In order to grow, plants perform
photosynthesis to store sugars and produce energy. One of the main inputs in this process is carbon
dioxide, which the plants gather from the air. As most plants grow, the carbon that was stored as
sugar is used to produce biomass, making up a majority of the plant’s structures. Part of the
biomass of the plant will be located under the soil in the form of stems or roots (Sokol et al 2018).
When the plant eventually dies, the biomass in the soil is decomposed and turned into soil organic
carbon (SOC). If the soil is not disturbed, this carbon will remain in the ground for hundreds of
years before re-entering the atmospheric pool.
The study of soil sequestration to mitigate climate change is based on this concept. In the
United States alone, over 897 million acres (about twice the area of Alaska) of land are farmed
annually (USDA-NASS 2020), but only about 140 million of these acres are enrolled in federal
farm conservation programs (USDA-NASS 2017). Regenerative agricultural practices such as notill, cover crops, crop rotation, and limited application of chemical fertilizer are often a requirement
of these programs and have the result of increasing soil carbon sequestration rates. While 140
million acre is a large area (about the size of New York and California combined) there still exists
potential to store more carbon in our soils.

Increasing Soil Carbon Sequestration with Economic Incentives
Besides carbon sequestration, there are many benefits to practicing regenerative
agriculture, such as increased biodiversity, reduced runoff, minimized soil erosion, and improved
ecosystem resilience (White 2020). There might also be costs, including potential initial costs such
as the purchase of new equipment or greater time spent working (Manley et al 2005). A farmer’s
job includes risk assessment; they must use data and prior knowledge to make decisions for what
and how much to plant, how much fertilizer to apply, how much to irrigate, etc. (Selvaraju 2012).
For this reason, most farmers tend to prefer to use methods of farming that are familiar and reliable
and are hesitant to switch to something new. Poor implementation of a new practice could result
in a loss of income that the farmer and his or her family is counting on. Therefore, regenerative
agricultural practices are often incentivized by the government to encourage farmers to adopt them.
The results of these practices are a net benefit to society, so the government justifies the taxpayer
expense.
Incentives do not always come from governments, however. Producers can be enticed to
farm using carbon sequestering methods if they can accurately quantify and then sell the amount
of carbon dioxide that has been sequestered as a carbon offset credit. In this way, the free market
works to internalize a negative externality (carbon dioxide emissions) by making the externality a
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commodity that has value (Varadarajan 2020). Demand also must exist for the market to sustain
itself. If there is great demand from consumers and businesses to offset carbon intensive activities
such as flying in a plane, the price paid to farmers per ton of carbon dioxide sequestered will be
higher and more producers will be likely to use sequestration techniques. Conversely, if demand
is not high, prices will be low and a small number of farmers will put in the time and effort required
to sequester carbon (Gale 1955).
If private enterprise can so easily provide a solution to the problem, why hasn’t it? Carbon
markets have existed and failed in the past, and some are still operating today. The United States’
main carbon market, the Chicago Climate Exchange, failed in 2011 after collapsed demand
(Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi, 2016) and other factors that will be discussed later. More recently, several
private firms have begun to contract with farmers to sequester an agreed upon amount of carbon
dioxide, then sell those carbon credits by the ton to consumers.
For a modern agricultural carbon market to work, we need to understand why past markets
have failed and the dynamics of supply and demand for soil-sequestered carbon. This report and
literature review will provide information on how current and future agricultural carbon markets
can succeed and the tools necessary for fair, accurate, and effective transactions to take place in
the market.

Guiding Research Questions
The work for this research began with a single question: How can an agricultural carbon
market work? After doing preliminary research on the subject, five additional questions were
proposed to supplement the main question. Each of the sections in this literature review will be
centered around answering one of the five supplementary questions.

How can an agricultural carbon market work?
•
•
•
•
•

Why have past agricultural carbon markets failed?
What challenges do agricultural carbon markets face?
How can an agricultural carbon market be sustained in the long term?
Are agricultural carbon markets effective at sequestering carbon?
Are agricultural carbon markets equitable?

Goals of this Report
Climate change is a pressing issue that requires immediate action, and a carbon market
predicated on regenerative agriculture is a potentially important solution. Information related to
the factors of supply, demand, verification, and measurement of an agricultural carbon market is
critical to the successful and long-term function of the market. The purpose of this report is to
answer the research questions outlined in greater detail below. The findings of this report will be
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made public and aim to serve those who want to participate in or aid the market including farmers,
agricultural commodity boards, government officials, and carbon offset consumers.

What are agricultural carbon offset payment programs?
Many people have heard the term “goods” before, likely in reference to products or services
in the marketplace. Not as many are familiar with the concept of an economic “bad”- the opposite
of an economic good. While goods provide the consumer with utility in the form of greater
satisfaction, economic bads detract from our utility and cause less satisfaction (Turvey 2000). As
is well established by climate science, the release of carbon dioxide from anthropogenic activities
is an economic bad (Li et al 2019). Additional carbon dioxide (a greenhouse gas) in our atmosphere
causes more heat to be trapped on Earth, resulting in a myriad of negative effects for the global
population (Tol 2009). Therefore, consumers who desire to lessen the effects of climate change
value less atmospheric greenhouse gases. While consumers will pay to have a greater amount of
goods, they will also pay to have a lesser amount of bads- think paying for a trash disposal service.
The actions of a single individual are relatively insignificant, but the collective action resulting
from a carbon market can potentially be enough to make a dent in the amount of carbon dioxide
in our atmosphere. This concept is fundamental to the operation of carbon offset payment
programs.
In a carbon market, consumers exchange money for the rights to claim a carbon offset,
which is an agreed upon amount of carbon dioxide that is either not emitted where it otherwise
would be or sequestered directly from the air into a non-atmospheric form (Lovell and Liverman
2010). A carbon offset is an example of a credence good, which is a good that gives the consumer
satisfaction due to its qualities, even though the consumer cannot experience them. While the
consumer’s life is not directly made better by the transaction, they recognize the severity of the
climate crisis and gain utility from the knowledge that they are decreasing the amount of carbon
dioxide emitted. The consumer’s money is transferred to a marketplace institution that facilitates
transactions of carbon offsets between buyers and sellers, then passed on to the seller of the carbon
offset. Many of the sellers in the carbon offset market are farmers who are actively sequestering
carbon dioxide in their ground through regenerative farming practices (Giller et al 2021), and the
payment they receive helps cover any costs associated with the change of farming method.
The institution that facilitates carbon offset transactions is important for two reasons. First,
carbon dioxide offsets are dissimilar to the purchase of other products. The consumer does not
receive a physical product as they would if they went to the store and bought something, and they
also do not receive a service. Instead, they receive confirmation that a measured amount of carbon
dioxide has been sequestered on their behalf (Liu et al 2015). For the confirmation to be legitimate,
it must be verified. This requires accurate methods of measuring soil organic carbon (SOC), which
will be discussed later in the literature review. A carbon market institution can standardize the

6

verification and measurement methods, ensuring every carbon offset is equally valuable (Haya et
al 2020).
Second, the market is more efficient when there is an entity that handles the transactions
between buyers and sellers. It would be inefficient for every buyer to individually contact a seller
that they were interested in purchasing carbon credits from and arrange for their own measurement
and verification costs (Bessy and Chauvin 2013). Some larger farming operations might have
thousands of metric tons to sell and arranging sales that might be a few tons at a time would be
both time consuming and expensive for the farm operation. Conversely, the consumer might desire
to purchase more metric tons at once than any one producer could provide. For example, Microsoft
has purchased 1.3 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions offsets in 2021 through the
company TruTerra (Watson 2021). As there is not an agricultural operation producing anywhere
near this amount, Microsoft would have had to expend time and money procuring smaller amounts
of offsets. Without the intermediary, the volume of carbon offset transactions would decrease as
the transaction cost would be higher, reducing quantity demanded.
Even though the product may be unlike those in a traditional market, carbon markets are
still governed by the same economic principles of supply and demand. Given consumer demand
exists for offsets and agricultural producers are willing to invest in producing them, as well as an
entity to facilitate transactions, the result should be a net negative amount of atmospheric carbon.
But how effective are agricultural carbon offset programs?

Are agricultural carbon markets effective?
When tackling an issue as large as climate change, no one solution will solve the problem.
Rather, a combination of solutions involving decreasing the amount of carbon emissions now and
sequestering atmospheric carbon to extend the carbon budget will be used. Frequently touted as a
cost-effective solution (Osborne 2015), the commodification of carbon dioxide has potential to
offset a substantial portion of global climate emissions. However, critics say that the market simply
moves money around without keeping carbon dioxide out of the air (Gilbertson 2017). This section
will explore the variables that determine how much carbon dioxide agricultural carbon markets
sequester.

Voluntary vs Regulatory
Debate among economists and scientists about the way a carbon market should (or should
not) be regulated has existed since their genesis. A regulatory carbon market arises when a
governing body either imposes a tax on carbon emissions or imposes limits on carbon dioxide
emissions (Schillie n.d.). If the regulations allow pollution permits to be tradable, polluters who
face high pollution reduction costs will buy permits from polluters who face low pollution
reduction costs. Prices for the permits are established based on the buyer’s willingness to pay and
the seller’s pollution abatement costs. Like how cryptocurrencies derive their value based on a
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finite amount of the currency being available, each emissions credit has value because it gives its
holder the ability to emit carbon dioxide when only a set amount can be emitted (Fang et al 2017).
The opposite of a regulatory approach to market governance is a voluntary one. In a
voluntary carbon market, there is no emissions cap ((Schillie n.d.), so for the buyers each credit’s
value comes from consumer demand and the utility it can provide. Buyers in a voluntary carbon
market might be motivated by wanting to claim low-carbon or carbon-free status. The market is
also largely unregulated, resulting in a possible difference in standards. This type of market can
cover multiple sectors of the economy since no regulation is involved targeting specific sectors.
Any carbon offset or sequestration credit (both offset and credit refer to the same thing and can be
used interchangeably) can be priced and sold in the carbon marketplace, no matter the industry it
came from. One benefit of this type of market structure is that there is no cap to the amount of
carbon dioxide that can be sequestered (Corbera et al 2009). If supply and demand push the
equilibrium quantity above where the cap would be if the market were government regulated, the
voluntary market is more successful than the regulated one at sequestering carbon.
Another advantage the voluntary market has is that it fosters innovation (Guigon 2010). In
response to the questionable results of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), standards in the North American voluntary market were developed to determine how
much carbon was being sequestered beyond normal rates- a concept known as additionality
(Michaelowa et al 2019). Also, because there is less regulation and compliance guidelines, more
entities are free to enter and exit the market. Regulated markets can sometimes have the unintended
effect of keeping some producers out because they lack technical or financial capital (Guigon
2010). In a voluntary agricultural carbon market, any producer is free to participate if their carbon
offsets meet the standard put forth by the market for a particular offset. This effect helps keep
smaller producers on the same footing as the larger corporations.
In considering the potential effectiveness of a particular offset market, it is imperative that
the perspective of the farmer-suppliers be considered as well as that of the buyers. An
overwhelming majority of farmers prefer a voluntary approach to carbon markets over a regulatory
one (Kitchens 2020; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 2021; Schattenberg 2021). Reasons
for this include a general dislike of government constraints that limit their ability to do what they
think is best for their crop. In a voluntary market, farmers choose to participate in the marketplace
and make changes in the way they farm, whereas regulatory market conditions might force them
to make changes they don’t want to. Carbon sequestration credit producers are also concerned
about the increasing amount of market power wielded by agricultural product buyers and the
possibility of losing market share to large companies. Voluntary markets allow small producers to
participate in the same market as the corporations, whereas if a compliance market were to be put
in place they might not be able to participate due to possible economies of scale in meeting
regulatory requirements.
Overall, the existing literature shows that the benefits of regulatory and voluntary carbon
markets are mixed. Voluntary markets may have a credibility problem. The lesser standards for
offsets produce credits that won’t last as long, and the variability in verification services reduces
the amount of standardization. However, there is a downside to regulatory markets as well. Basic
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supply and demand show the same thing: when a tax or restriction is placed on the market, price
increases and quantity demanded decreases, resulting in a deadweight loss and a less efficient
market (Hausman 1981). There is not enough evidence to definitively say whether one type of
market structure is better than the other, so the effectiveness of a carbon market will depend heavily
on other factors.

Regional vs Global
The scope of agricultural carbon markets is another determinant of their efficacy. Regional
markets have the potential to be specialized and better serve producers locally, but global markets
give access to remote producers and people in places where a regional carbon market does not
exist (Michaelowa 2011). Due to the scale at which global markets operate, they are less likely to
be regulated as well. Perhaps the most well-known global carbon market is the Kyoto Protocol’s
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that allowed the trading of carbon credits internationally
and aimed to promote sustainable development in rural communities. Unfortunately, the CDM
failed to deliver on most of its promises (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011) and the legitimacy of its
credits was called into question.
In a 2017 research paper, NYU Professor of Environmental Studies Jessica F. Green argues
that linking regional carbon markets into a larger conglomerate ultimately makes them less
effective. Green’s reasoning is that the more governments there are trying to regulate a carbon
market, the more volatile prices can be within the market (Green 2017). She notes that if it were
possible to create one central, global carbon bank the stability of the market would likely be enough
to promote trade and expansion, but the difference in standards and currencies simply make the
idea unattainable. Contrarily, in a 2010 research paper Fankhauser and Hepburn argue that the
linking of carbon markets provides flexibility in the market, which helps to reduce compliance
costs producers face. They also note that in a more traditional product market, the higher the
number of buyers and sellers the greater the stability of the market (Fankhauser and Hepburn 2010)
(Lanzi et al 2012). While the combining of regional markets for other products often produces
favorable results, carbon credits are not like other products. As it stands right now, the existing
literature is not clear on which geographic approach produces the most effective results for carbon
sequestration.

Effectiveness of Agricultural Carbon Markets
When reviewing the existing literature surrounding meaningful carbon dioxide
sequestration because of carbon market policies, scientists make cases for and against the practice.
It is widely recognized as a cost-effective solution to the climate crisis (Boyce 2018) due to classic
economic reasoning. When faced with a negative externality, consumers choose the cheapest way
to internalize the externality, enabling society to efficiently allocate resources to the problem (Yin
and Lawphongpanich 2006). This leads to “picking the low-hanging fruit” first and quickly
decreasing atmospheric carbon dioxide in the most efficient way. In this section, the effectiveness
9

of a carbon market depends on the market’s ability to sequester the maximum amount of carbon
dioxide, disregarding cost.
As discussed before, implementation of a carbon market often leads to an increase in
innovation in response. The United States’ cap and trade system for sulfur dioxide emissions is a
fitting example of this phenomenon. According to a research paper from 2000, this program caused
rapid technological innovation to occur within the first 10 years of its use (Burtraw 2000), enabling
power
plants
to
cut
back
on
sulfur
dioxide
emissions
even
more.
Data from the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) supports this concept further.
The ETS is a compliance carbon offset market resulting from emissions caps on carbon dioxide.
It involves members of the European Union in a cap-and-trade system, and many of its carbon
credits come from agriculture. After the commodification of carbon dioxide in the EU, patents
regarding “low carbon technologies” increased (Calel and Dechezlepretre 2016). We could expect
a similar jumpstart to U.S. funding and research if American carbon markets grew to a place of
prominence in our agricultural and resource economies.
Carbon markets have another advantage over other types of emissions reduction policies.
Anyone is welcome to participate in a carbon market, resulting in greater equity (Stavins 2008).
Carbon taxes usually regulate large industrial centers and power plants, excluding individuals to
some extent (although the tax might get passed on in some capacity to the consumer). However,
in a carbon market any individual is free to offset his or her personal emissions directly through
the purchase of carbon credits.
Most of the critical literature on voluntary carbon markets focuses on the fact that when
implemented alone, they will not sequester enough atmospheric carbon to keep Earth’s warming
below a tipping point of 1.5°C (Kuhns and Shaw 2018). This is true, and the fact is climate change
is a global problem with many necessary solutions. An agricultural carbon market will be most
effective when used in conjunction with other forms of carbon dioxide emission reduction and
sequestration. Carbon taxes and cap and trade are two other useful tools which will be discussed
in the next section.

Other Methods of Reducing Emissions
Carbon Tax
A tax on carbon is one government way of dealing with carbon emissions directly. The
economic reasoning supporting a carbon tax is that carbon dioxide is a pollutant that creates a
decrease in social welfare, so raising the cost of emitting a metric ton of carbon should decrease
the quantity that is emitted (Metcalf 2019). If a government is considering implementing a carbon
tax, they commission research to find the optimal price of the tax so that an effective amount of
carbon dioxide will not be emitted when it otherwise would be. Supporters of a carbon tax argue
that the tax keeps fossil fuels in the ground, which is one of the most effective ways to minimize
the release of carbon in the first place (Van der Ploeg and Withagen 2014). They also say it is the
most cost effective at bringing down emissions levels (Lin and Li n.d.). Proposed ideas for the
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revenue generated from a carbon tax include reinvesting the funds into renewable energy research,
a rebate to the American taxpayer, or a combination of both.
Any solution comes with drawbacks, however. One of the main criticisms of carbon taxes
is that they unfairly distribute the tax burden over income levels (Williams III et al 2015). It is
considered a regressive tax because low-income persons would pay a larger fraction of their
income in the tax than would higher income persons. This decreases the tax burden for an
individual the higher their income level is, and some economists claim that a carbon tax would
have this effect. It may also be politically difficult to implement, depending on the public’s
perception of what will be done with the tax revenue (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015). Still, these
issues are ones that can be overcome for a carbon tax to be implemented and work alongside
agricultural carbon markets synergistically.

Cap and Trade
Cap and trade is frequently mentioned in conjunction with carbon markets. The term is
used to refer to when a government sets a limit on the amount of a pollutant that can be released
over a set time period (the “cap”) and then distributes emissions permits to firms in the affected
industries (Stavins 2008). Each firm can then decide to either reduce their own emissions and sell
their excess permits (if any) or continue to emit at the same level and buy permits from other firms
to comply with the policy. This results in efficient use of resources by industry as the cheapest
methods of reducing emissions are employed first (Chen et al 2020). Proponents of a cap and trade
system argue it is beneficial for this reason as well as its ability to put a hard cap on the amount of
annual emissions, providing a degree of certainty (Kaufman 2016).
Critics of cap and trade claim energy producers and other carbon intensive industries are
too hard hit by the policy (Curtis 2014) and the technology for low carbon operations does not
exist yet. However, this first criticism seems to be directed at the EPA’s Nitrous NOx Budget
Trading Program and not at any carbon cap and trade program. As shown by the effect of the U.S.
government putting a cap on sulfur dioxide emissions, innovation flourishes in response to efforts
to curb pollution. Others argue that there exists a “rebound effect” that limits the gains in emissions
cuts received by increasing efficiency due to consumer behavior (Jarke-Neuert and Perino 2020).
While there may be some drawbacks economically, multiple governments have employed cap and
trade programs with success (Wood 2018), and again is a tool in the overall need to lower carbon
emissions.

Summary
As discussed in the introduction, global climate change is too large a problem to require
just one solution. Evidence from both voluntary and regulatory carbon market performance shows
that they are effective at sequestering (in the case of agriculture) and keeping carbon dioxide from
being released (in the form of offsets), while the polices of a carbon tax and cap and trade help by
setting emissions caps and regulating heavy carbon industries. The degree to which each is
11

employed around the world will vary by region, but all three are valid solutions to help stop
anthropogenic climate change. A report by the World Resources Institute finds that as long as these
policies are well designed, most critics’ claims are no longer supported by evidence (Kaufman
2016). Several voluntary carbon markets have existed in the past or still exist today, and the next
section will focus on the successes and failures of each.

History of Programs That Provide Carbon Offset Payments
to Farmers
The concept of a carbon market that trades offsets generated by agriculture is not a novel
one. Earlier markets, such as the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), linked large and small scale
producers and consumers to trade 680 million metric ton credits throughout the course of its
operation (CCX 2010). Even before the CCX was the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism, which aimed to encourage investment from “developed” countries into emissions
offset projects in “developing” ones. Later, the European Emissions Trading System was founded
and still trades credits today. What were the successes and failures that led these markets to where
they are now?

The Chicago Climate Exchange
The most prominent American carbon market, the Chicago Climate Exchange, began
trading in 2003 as a voluntary market for six different greenhouse gases (Clark 2005). CCX sought
large businesses and governing entities as consumers and garnered carbon offsets from agricultural
producers, mainly the forestry sector (Streck et al 2009). Members could then purchase CCX
offsets to comply with the commitments they had made to CCX, described below.
There were two initial phases to the CCX. In phase I, members of the Chicago Climate
Exchange made a legally binding commitment to decrease their emissions by 1% every year
between 2003 and 2006 (Clark 2005). Each member’s baseline emissions were calculated by
taking the average of the respective entity’s emissions between 1998 and 2001, and the changes in
emissions levels were found by comparing current emissions output (minus credits) against the
baseline emissions number. Phase II occurred from 2006 through 2010 and required members to
achieve emissions levels 6% below their baseline value by 2010. Members had the option of either
reducing their own physical emissions (by decreasing production or upgrading to lower carbon
technologies) or purchasing carbon offsets through the exchange. Carbon offsets could only be
used to fulfill up to 50% of each member’s reduction obligation, however. Participation in Phase
I was not required to participate in Phase II, although the emissions reductions requirements
remained unchanged at 6% below baseline for all Phase II members.
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Offsets purchased by members were verified by an approved third-party service to maintain
the integrity of the system and give the offsets their value. Objective verification is a necessary
component of carbon markets; without it the market would have less price stability and fail to
sequester the reported amount of pollutant (Moura Costa et al 1999). To sell offsets on the Chicago
Climate Exchange, each offset producer was required to hire their own verification service from a
selection of CCX approved firms for an annual verification inspection (De Pinto et al 2010). The
offset market was wide in scope. As of 2007, 82 million tons of offsets were generated in just the
three years prior from 9,000 farmers on 16 million acres (about the area of South Carolina) of land.
Most of these projects were within the United States, but about a quarter were internationally
located. To participate in the Chicago Climate Exchange, each offset producer had to prove their
method of generating offsets met the requirements for additionality. Their method could not
already be required by law and was required to be an “uncommon” practice within their industrial
sector. Applications from offset producers were reviewed by an offsets committee within CCX to
ensure their project would provide quality emissions offsets, and if approved the measured and
verified amount of offsets would be sold on the CCX market.
Companies and municipalities that participated in the CCX did so voluntarily, which is
partly what caused the market to eventually fail. While the commitments to reducing emissions
were legally binding, supply simply outstripped demand. Up to 50% of CCX offsets could be used
to satisfy the emissions reduction targets, but as of 2007 only 15% of reductions achieved under
the CCX program came from offsets. Members joined for the opportunity to advertise their “green”
stewardship to consumers or out of a sense of social responsibility, but no laws existed requiring
heavy polluters to account for their carbon emissions. It appears that when the fiscal crisis of 2008
hit, companies simply lost interest in their own carbon footprint and instead redirected their efforts
towards keeping their stock price from plummeting. After Phase II ended in 2010, the Chicago
Climate Exchange was no longer trading emissions credits (Spaargaren and Mol 2013) due to lack
of demand.

The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism
Created as a piece of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) was an offset tool that could be used to meet the carbon emission limits set on each
participating country (Barrett 1998). Pioneering the field of carbon offset markets, the CDM faced
many challenges over the course of its operation. Its main component involved the funding of
emissions reductions projects in lower-income countries by higher-income countries so that the
higher income-countries could claim the carbon offsets produced by the project. The market was
advertised as a solution to climate change as well as economic stimulus for lower-income countries
and thus attracted many supporters (Gillenwater and Seres 2011). A key feature was the flexibility
of the mechanism- it allowed countries time to develop and implement low-carbon technologies
while funding carbon emissions reductions in lower cost regions of the world (Grubb et al 2010).
Additionality was a major challenge for the Clean Development Mechanism. The scientists
behind the CDM worked at creating an extensive set of guidelines and rules to determine if
13

proposed projects would have occurred without the influence of the CDM (Greiner and
Michaelowa 2003), and thus they knew that to be effective the mechanism had to be reliable and
trustworthy. An Executive Board issued the final decision after discussion about a project, and
once approved the offset could be sold in the marketplace. Verification costs also proved to be
greater than expected, leading to high transaction costs in the market (Joshi 2012).
The CDM hits its peak in 2008 after being linked with the EU’s Emissions Trading System
which created a broader marketplace and encouraged participation (Michaelowa et al 2019).
However, this occurred at the same time as the global fiscal crisis, leading to the same outcome as
the Chicago Climate Exchange. By linking the CDM and ETS, there was simply an oversupply of
credits at a time when demand was dropping. The price of a credit subsequently decreased as well
(Green 2017) to the point where the market was not a worthwhile endeavor for producers. Today,
the CDM still maintains active sequestration projects but does not have anywhere near the level of
activity it contained thirteen years ago.

The European Union’s Emissions Trading System
In response to new commitments set by the European Union on the amount of carbon
dioxide emitted annually, the Emissions Trading System (ETS) was developed (European
Commission 2021). Instead of relying on individuals’ voluntary inclinations to purchase carbon
offsets like the Chicago Climate Exchange, the system set a cap on the amount of emissions to
ensure its targets were met. The cap was to be decreased every year, eventually drawing emissions
down to a more sustainable number. This cap and trade method is touted as economically efficient
because it will result in the least-costly emissions reductions happening first (Mandell 2008). It
also allows for flexibility in the industry for polluters who may not be able to immediately reduce
their carbon footprint. If the technology is not readily available but could be developed within a
feasible amount of time, firms can choose to buy allowances from the ETS market until they can
reduce their own carbon emissions.
Along with the CCX and CDM, the ETS was dramatically affected by the 2008 financial
crisis. From 2008-2012, a backlog of credits piled up as extremely limited demand left prices low.
However, the European Union commission overseeing the function of the ETS market produced a
solution that enabled the system to survive. They introduced a measure that postponed the
auctioning off of 900 million carbon credits until 2019 (European Commission 2017). Supply was
artificially reduced as a result, which coincided with slowly increasing demand as the world’s
economies recovered. Prices began to return to pre-recession levels, and the commission was
careful to maintain a sustainable balance of credits in the market so as to not force the price to be
too high or too low. This solution, called the Market Stability Reserve, serves as an important
lesson for carbon markets. The supply of credits in a marketplace can be reduced by temporarily
banking credits to ensure prices remain high enough to incentivize production of credits by future
projects (Kreibich and Hermwille 2021). Otherwise, trading will come to a halt and the market
will have a tough time recovering.
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Summary
The three historical carbon markets listed above offer a wealth of information for us to
learn from. A multitude of literature has been written discussing aspects of each market, and the
modern markets are remarkably similar in some ways. The ETS is notably the only market out of
these three that is still trading a high volume of credits today, due to their Market Stability Reserve
action. While a similar policy could not be enacted in a voluntary market due to the absence of a
single governing body, the individual private marketplaces could adopt policies that restrict the
number of new credits if supply within that marketplace gets too high. This would help to ensure
that voluntary carbon markets of the present are sustainable in the long term.

Status of Current Programs and Proposals for Carbon
Offset Payments to Farmers
Nori
Founded in the fall of 2017, Nori began as a business plan entry in the “ConsenSys
Blockchain for Social Impact Hackathon” (Nori 2021). After winning the competition, the
business plan was turned into a real company and has been growing quickly. Nori’s goal is to enlist
agricultural producers to supply carbon offsets through change of practices, then sell those offsets
on their own voluntary carbon market (Thompson et al 2021). One crucial aspect of running a
successful carbon offset market is having well defined methodology: policies and specific
verification methods that are standardized across all suppliers so that each carbon offset credit has
equal value. Nori provides this information with their “Croplands Methodology” document, which
explains the eligibility of crop types, additionality, length of the project, and the lifecycle of one
of their offset credits.
Nori’s carbon offsets are called “Nori Removal Tonnes” (NRT) and are equivalent to one
metric ton of carbon removed from the atmosphere. Currently, Nori bases their offsets on the
standard of how likely the carbon is to stay in the ground for at least 10 years (Nori 2020). When
an NRT is sold, Nori assigns it a score reflecting the likelihood of the carbon meeting this longevity
standard. The supplier of the NRT is then paid accordingly. By using a scoring system for
longevity, the marketplace innately encourages suppliers to use quality carbon sequestration
practices and continue carbon storage into the future.
Similar to the cryptocurrency market, Nori uses blockchain technology to keep track of
and verify transactions made in their marketplace (Donnelly 2020). Each NRT produced by one
of their suppliers is turned into a token which enables it to be tracked via blockchain (Chen 2018).
Consumers of Nori’s credits can instantly and securely purchase and receive NRTs, removing
costly and time-consuming human-based security actions (Woo et al 2020). Currently each NRT
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is sold for $15 plus a 15% transaction fee for Nori’s marketplace services, and the supplier of the
NRT receives the full $15 purchase price. Once an NRT token is sold, it is immediately retired
from the marketplace and cannot be sold further (Nori 2020). These combined practices ensure
proper carbon accounting for credits sold by Nori and bar any double counting of offsets.

Indigo Ag
Indigo Ag is a more recent participant in the carbon offsets industry. They began seeking
out farmers in early 2021 to provide carbon sequestration credits by practicing regenerative
agriculture (Spratt et al 2021). The company’s approach is centered around the farmer. Indigo
works with farmers to determine the amount of land enrolled in the program, then it is up to the
farmer to make changes in the way they farm and send that data to Indigo. The farmer continues
to collect and send data to Indigo over the course of the year, and Indigo takes a physical soil
sample from selected acres (Indigo 2021). After receiving a farmer’s annual data and the results
of the soil samples, Indigo calculates the amount of carbon dioxide that has been sequestered and
sends the number to Verra, an independent verification firm. They verify the amount of carbon
sequestered with their Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) (Verra 2021), and Indigo is then free to
market and sell the carbon credits. Once the credits sell, the producer receives payment for their
sequestration efforts.
For agricultural producers who register acres with Indigo right now, a potential credit price
of $15 per ton is advertised. Indigo notes that as the market expands, this price is subject to change
in response to supply and demand. Several large companies have signed contracts with Indigo
already, promising to purchase carbon offsets at a price of $20 per ton (Indigo 2021). The
difference between the consumer purchase price and the payment the producer receives goes
towards verification of the credits and the upkeep of the marketplace. By aggregating carbon
credits to be sold to consumers on the voluntary market, transaction costs between parties are
minimized (Wang et al 2021) and theoretically more credits should be exchanged as a result.
The Indigo Carbon market program was created after the company’s 2019 Terraton
Initiative (Keenor et al 2021), a challenge to sequester one trillion tons of carbon dioxide in the
world’s soils and improve soil and atmospheric health as a result. Indigo encouraged individuals
and teams to innovate and improve on existing technology for sequestration and verification of
soil organic carbon, with rewards for the best ideas (UBC 2019). This is just one example of how
the need for voluntary carbon markets sparks technological advancement and can result in more
carbon dioxide sequestered.

Truterra
A third prominent U.S. voluntary carbon market is Truterra’s TruCarbon program. Truterra
is farmer-owned and operates Land O’Lakes’ sustainability program, currently making TruCarbon
the only farmer owned voluntary carbon market available (Boland et al 2020). Its process of
generating carbon credits is very similar to those of Nori and Indigo Ag. First, the farmer registers
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acres with the TruCarbon program and implements one or more change of practices. Throughout
the growing and harvesting season, data is collected and sent to Truterra and stratified soil samples
are taken and tested after harvest. The stratified soil testing process divides soils into zones that
are likely to have similar changes in SOC, and Truterra employs this method to save costs. Using
the aggregated data and results from the soil sample tests, Truterra determines additionality and
verifies the appropriate amount of carbon sequestered. After verification, the carbon credits go
through certification against market standards then can be sold to buyers in the marketplace. Even
after the credits are sold, the farmer must continue to provide information on how they are keeping
up practices that retain the carbon in the soil (Truterra 2021).
A notable aspect of the TruCarbon program is the willingness to accept carbon
sequestration that occurred up to five years ago (Thompson et al 2021). This “look back” policy is
different from other modern voluntary carbon markets. Most programs require the registration of
acres first, then implementation of the change of practice that satisfies additionality, but Trucarbon
is unique in this way. However, as the carbon offset market continues to develop, the focus on
higher quality credits that have proven additionality will likely be increased.
As a company that already conducts agricultural business outside of the voluntary carbon
markets, Truterra has a valuable resource at its disposal. Data sharing and management are
considered to be critical to the success of voluntary carbon markets (Amelung et al 2020). When
producers can efficiently organize and send management data to the market aggregator, the quality
and therefore marketability of the credits will be higher. Truterra has developed an “insights
engine” to streamline the process of reporting additionality and continued stewardship practices.
Some commercial bulk purchasers of carbon credits will find value in this additional layer of data
when they can market their offsets as being maintained in the soil and have the data to support this
claim (Cerri et al 2021).

Challenges Facing Modern Voluntary Carbon Markets
Supply

and
Demand
One of the main reasons the Chicago Climate Exchange failed is the lack of demand
and overabundant supply. The fiscal crisis of 2008 shifted the world’s focus from fixing the future
to fixing the present, and demand ultimately dried up when companies were forced into survival
mode. On the opposite end of the spectrum, between the Clean Development Mechanism, the
Emissions Trading System, and the Chicago Climate Exchange there were simply too many
sequestration projects verified and producing credits. This led to a large supply of credits with
limited buyers (DiPerna 2018).
To maintain a balanced supply of carbon credits that meets demand, firms that are trying
to create a carbon market should carefully research the economics of the industry and only register
a predetermined number of acres. This will ensure that the price of their carbon offset certificates
remains high enough to incentivize the production of more credits and provide producers with fair
compensation. Legislation, such as the Growing Climate Solutions Act, focuses on issues
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surrounding a fair price for farmers to receive for credits and was passed in June of 2021 (US
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry 2021).
As far as demand goes, much has happened in the eleven years since the end of the CCX.
Climate education is now a fundamental part of the scientific curriculum in many school districts
around the country (Schreiner et al 2008). Youth movements have begun to affect mainstream
politics (O’Brien et al 2018), and the business world is finally seeing the problem for what it is
and the opportunities that come with it (Bristow 2021). While still very divided on the issue of
climate change politically, the majority of American society is concerned and desires immediate
action. The purchase of millions of tons of offsets by Microsoft earlier this year speaks to how
desirable the credits are, and other major US companies will soon be looking for similarly largescale markets to purchase from. Individual consumers who are concerned about climate change
will also bolster demand for credits as it has already become somewhat mainstream to offset
emissions from flights and other carbon intensive activities.

Verification
Accurate verification of sequestered carbon gives the credits their value and ensures double
counting does not occur. Unlike projects like REDD+, which deal with conservation of tropical
ecosystems, a majority of carbon sequestration projects in the United States are agriculturally and
agroforestry based. Verification standards are necessary to ensure quality offsets (Streck 2020).
However, verification processes are time consuming and expensive.
Innovation is lowering the cost of verification through adaptation of technologies like
blockchain and will help make verified credits more attainable (Hua et al 2020). Blockchain also
improves security in the carbon market as it precisely records every transaction associated with a
specific credit, preventing credits being resold and the offset being claimed multiple times.
Verification services such as the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and the Verra Verified Climate
Standard offer the service to markets resulting from the need for standardized verification (Gifford
2020). To pay for verification, some markets (such as Nori) charge a service fee for every credit
purchased. Nori’s fee is only 10%, and since it is charged on top of the credit price the producer
still receives full compensation for any extra costs. This type of policy incentivizes farmers to
produce credits for a marketplace that covers verification costs and standardizes the credits sold in
the marketplace.

Data Utilization
Each marketplace is different when it comes to data privacy. As there is no tangible
physical product being exchanged during carbon sequestration, data sharing is key to creating and
verifying the carbon credits (Amelung et al 2020). Market firms need to know how long the carbon
has been in the soil, the density of carbon in the soil before and after the change of practice, and
current management practices on the acres involved. Markets will have different requirements
about data sharing regarding the type, frequency, and availability of the data, so farmers who are
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considering participating in the market should examine all aspects of the agreement made with the
marketplace about data ownership (Brooks 2021).

Longevity of Offsets
To be effective in reducing carbon dioxide levels and preventing the worst effects of
climate change, some degree of permanence must be established for the carbon sequestration
credits in a marketplace. Agricultural carbon sequestration is unique in that the carbon that has
been sequestered can be released again due to improper management. For example, a farmer could
change from conventional till to no till and sell carbon credits for his or her land. However, if the
land is then sold, or a lease expires, and a new operator manages that ground now they might not
continue the same sequestration practices. Re-tilling of the ground would release most of the
carbon from the previously sequestered offsets (McLauchlan 2006) and result in invalidation of
the credits that had already been sold. For operators of family farms and land that has been held
for generations, this will not pose much of an issue but 54% of cropland is rented land in the United
States (USDA-ERS and USDA-NASS 2014). If a farmer who rents wants to participate in a carbon
market, an agreement will have to be reached with the landlord about the longevity of the offsets.
This might entail prevention of certain tillage practices on the land for a specified length of time.

Review of Literature Describing and Evaluating Voluntary
Agricultural Carbon Markets
When researching the subject of voluntary agricultural carbon markets, extensive popular
and scientific literature is available. However, there are major differences between the relevancy
and helpfulness of the information in each category. The existing scientific literature covers most
of the aspects of historical carbon markets (the Clean Development Mechanism, Chicago Climate
Exchange, and Emissions Trading System) but contains very little information on modern markets.
Nori, Indigo Ag, Truterra, and other newer markets have started their programs all within the last
year or two (with some yet to begin) so there has not been a lot of time for research on these
markets to occur. Additionally, it will be several years before data regarding price and volume of
credits traded has built up and can be studied empirically for trends. However, the research that
has been done on the CDM, CCX, and ETS is extensive and useful for studying how voluntary
carbon markets can succeed. Scientists have studied and written about the factors that caused each
market to succeed and fail, and these publications are of immense value to anyone looking to learn
from the mistakes and triumphs of these past markets.
On the other side, popular literature has become increasingly engrossed with the subject of
agricultural carbon credits since the beginning of 2021. The change of Presidential administration
spurred this interest as the Biden administration is determined to find economical solutions to
climate change. They have tasked the US Department of Agriculture with implementing a way for
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farmers to achieve net-zero greenhouse gas emissions from agricultural operations, and USDA is
reported to be looking into the idea of a carbon bank to assist farmers and the voluntary markets.
However, many of the popular articles about the rise of voluntary markets and how American
agriculture can play a part are written with considerable skepticism towards the idea. The shutdown
of the Chicago Climate Exchange in 2010 is still fresh in the agriculture industry’s mind, and they
understandably do not want to waste effort on a repeat market that might end the same way. The
industry is also resistant to government intervention, so the idea of a federally run carbon bank is
unappealing to some.
These perceptions are important to understanding agricultural carbon sequestration as
popular articles written by agricultural publications are one of the main sources of information for
ag producers. Public university extension services have also been providing information online
about signing carbon credit production contracts with market firms, which is a vital source in the
absence of scientific literature.

Popular Literature
Common Themes
Questions about measurement and verification are plentiful in popular articles written
about ag carbon markets. Early adopters of carbon credit production have used a variety of methods
to verify the amount sequestered, including drying soil samples in a battery powered oven before
being sent to a lab (Wilcox 2021), the Verra Verified Carbon Standard (Maixner and Brasher
2020), and modeling the management practices of an operation (Schattenberg 2021). Ultimately,
farmers want to know if the burden of verification is on them or the marketplace firm. If it is up to
individual producers to provide verification, carbon sequestration looks a lot less appealing. Nori
offers the choice of three different third-party verification services to farmers to avoid a conflict
of interest (Nori 2021), whereas other market firms state they will use an independent verifier but
do not specify who pays for the service.
Additionally, popular literature discusses how data will be used in modern carbon markets
and what the data privacy rights of farmers are. The process of generating valid carbon credits
hinges on producers submitting records on their planting schedule, management practices, and
field boundaries to the market they are working with. Some firms have created proprietary software
to enable farmers to efficiently report this information, but there are concerns about the accuracy
of such tools undermining the credibility of carbon credits (Giles 2021). Most discussions focus
on how integral data sharing is to the process, however. Because in-person verification services
are expensive, the more data that can be sent over the internet the more profit there is for the farmer
(Vogt 2021). To make it easier for farmers, Nori has partnered with Truterra to utilize data that
has already been entered into Truterra’s Insights Engine. If a producer already uses the insight
engine software for farm management, Nori will look at the Truterra data at the farmer’s request
and provide an estimate as to how much the farmer could expect to earn from carbon sequestration
(Successful Farming 2020). As the average age of American farmers is 57.5 (USDA-NASS 2017)
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the technology use and data imputation present a potential hurdle to overcome, so firms have a
vested interest in making their reporting software as user-friendly as possible.
Another concern represented in many popular articles is the issue of voluntary versus
compliance markets. As of August 2021, there is no compliance or non-voluntary market in the
United States. Nori, IndigoAg, Truterra, CIBO, etcetera are all optional, voluntary, and privately
run carbon markets. This issue is particularly important to the target producer demographic,
American farmers (Colman et al 2021). Even the notion of regulatory markets is enough to turn
off some potential carbon credit producers, so USDA and private firms working on carbon
marketplaces have been careful to emphasize that the markets are completely voluntary (Morgan
2020). The agricultural industry generally favors a non-regulatory approach (Kitchens 2020), and
the Biden administration appears to agree, so it does not look like the voluntary aspect of carbon
offset markets will be changing anytime soon.
Because the concept of voluntary carbon markets is being utilized on a larger scale and the
industry is growing rapidly, the market system can be overwhelming and complex to those who
are unfamiliar with it (Rushforth et al 2021). Especially as the age of American farmers is older
and many have been farming the same way for decades, rapid change to a new practice will not
come easy. There are two things that can make this transition easier: accurate, easily digestible
information from public university extension services and better reporting and measurement
technology. University agricultural extension services can bridge the gap of information for
farmers regarding voluntary carbon markets, especially regarding the concept of additionality
which can be difficult to determine (Giles 2021). These services might already be familiar to
farmers in their state and can act as a trusted source of reliable information. Technological
innovation will also help with the problem. New measurement technologies offer faster, more
effective testing than older methods, and streamlined reporting software makes reporting data take
the minimal amount of time from a farmer’s week (Maixner and Brasher 2020).

Topic Portrayal
Skepticism about the viability of voluntary carbon markets is prevalent throughout popular
literature. The novelty of the concept and the eventual shutdown of the Chicago Climate Exchange
have both contributed to farmers feeling hesitant to implement a change of practice and sell credits
on a market. However, the key to convincing producers this is a worthwhile endeavor will be
education and using data from the minority of farmers who have already begun selling carbon
credits.

Scientific Literature
Answered Questions
Over a decade has passed since the Chicago Climate Exchange ceased carbon credit trading
operations. In this time researchers have dug into the benefit to consumers (Gans and Hintermann
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2013; Boulatoff et al 2013), the relationship between agricultural ecosystem services and
marketability (Ribaudo et al 2010), the efficiency of informational exchange and data sharing
(Sabbaghi and Sabbaghi 2016), and additionality requirements (Kollmuss et al 2008). The CCX,
along with the European Union’s Emissions Trading System and the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism have been covered extensively in the scientific literature. The
information that is available is valuable to not only those who desire to run a voluntary carbon
market but also potential producers in the market, consumers, banks, investors, and agricultural
economists. While the Chicago Climate Exchange successfully traded hundreds of millions of
credits over the course of its operation, it ultimately came to an end. More than a decade later, with
the advantage of hindsight, multiple lessons (identified in the Supply and Demand section) can be
learned from it that will provide for better markets in the future.
There also exists plenty of literature on the differences between voluntary carbon markets
and other decarbonization mechanisms. An insightful paper by Jonathan D. Rubin explains how
market forces automatically act to make the least cost emissions reductions first, leading to market
efficiency (Rubin 1996). Scientists have also studied the relationship between cap and trade
legislation and prices for carbon markets (Mizrach 2012) and the effectiveness of voluntary
sequestration efforts with no government regulation (Yang 2006; Farleigh 2003). The existing
literature covers the aspects of voluntary markets, cap and trade, and carbon taxes and is continuing
to evolve as technology improves and policies are implemented.
Measurement of soil organic carbon (SOC) is vital to the functioning of any carbon
sequestration activities, and the scientific literature that discusses accurate methods of measuring
changes in SOC content is extensive. Scientists have written about the ability to measure SOC
content directly (Yan et al 2011) and on a regional scale (Stevens et al 2010), and both will be used
in modern carbon market systems. An article by Rattan Lal provides an in-depth look into the
multiple factors that affect soil carbon content, including changes of management practices (Lal
2018). Uncertainty also exists in some methods of soil organic carbon content estimation (Ogle et
al 2010), but the uncertainty can sometimes be accounted for in order to produce viable carbon
credits anyway (Stockmann et al 2013). While measurement technologies and methods are
continuously improving, soil carbon measurement is a subject that is pertinent to multiple fields,
not just the voluntary carbon market. The literature will continue to evolve as well.

Gaps in the Literature
Few scientific articles have been published about the re-emergence of carbon markets
within the past few years. Because these firms are so new, there has not been much literature
written about them. Significant gaps exist around the levels of supply and demand for carbon offset
credits in the present, which is pertinent information to the success of voluntary markets.
Additionally, there is an aspect of competition that has not been present in historical carbon
markets. Both producers and consumers of carbon offset credits have many choices on which
market firm they want to sell to/buy from, which creates economic competition that has not been
researched.
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Modern data reporting technology is an area that is also lacking scientific literature. Most
firms use similar but proprietary reporting technology, and it is of value to know how farmers use
the software. Differences in ability to report information on the software are problems that would
need to be addressed for the market to expand and provide all producers equal opportunity, but the
potential differences cannot be dealt with if they are unknown. Also, the amount of data producers
are required to report for different market firms is not public knowledge. If there were to be
scientific or informative literature comparing the data requirements for each program producers
would benefit from the additional information.
The final commonly overlooked issue regarding voluntary carbon markets is the equity
associated with this strategy of decarbonization. In the world of carbon offsets, the term “equity”
refers to ensuring groups who have been and will continue to be the most affected by climate
change are supplied with resources that increase their resilience. A well-researched article titled
Carbon Pricing: Effectiveness and Equity examines how the social cost of carbon relates to the
price of carbon credits in modern markets (Boyce 2018), but other than this paper there is not much
else. Equity is an important aspect of climate justice as the climate crisis affects everyone, and
everyone deserves a chance to be part of the solution. Additional research on how the voluntary
markets can be accessible to everyone would benefit policy makers and the firms running the
trading platform by helping them make informed decisions on how best to ensure equity.

Conclusion
Voluntary carbon markets are one of many important tools we have to help reverse the
consequences of the climate crisis. It is encouraging to see a resurgence of interest in the industry,
although both consumers and producers require more information than is available to fully
understand the benefits and potential drawbacks. Education can come from a variety of sources:
popular articles, scientific literature, university extension services, etc. Every method of carbon
sequestration and emissions reduction has pros and cons, and it is important to remember that these
solutions can be used in concert with one another to meet emissions reductions goals. Regional
differences, political atmospheres, and market systems will contribute to which methods are
suitable for a specific area. But the baseline is this: consumers desire carbon dioxide sequestration
credits, and agricultural producers have a way to potentially monetize their effort into producing
the credits. The two groups just need to be connected.
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